Airbnb in 2022 – Case Assignment Questions

Airbnb in 2022 – Case Assignment Questions
Assignment Questions
1. How would you illustrate and compare the business models for Airbnb, large hotel chains such
as Marriott and Hilton, and bed & breakfast operators? Use the example chart in the textbook
for business models as a guide (Concepts & Connections 1.1)
2. What are the general strengths and weaknesses of large hotel chains such as Marriott and
Hilton, bed & breakfasts, and Airbnb? Explain how you would compare and contrast those
businesses.
3. What was Airbnb’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic? Does it appear that the company’s
business model is more resilient than that of its hotel chain rivals?
4. In what ways has the lodging consumer changed, and how does Airbnb’s customer valueproposition meet this change?
5. What is your assessment of Airbnb’s financial performance since the company has gone
public?
6. What recommendations would you make to Airbnb to improve its competitiveness in the
accommodation market while mitigating any current and future risks?
1
case
AIRBNB IN 2022
®
JOHN D. VALARO Johnson & Wales University
JOHN E. GAMBLE Texas A&M University–Corpus Christi
Airbnb was launched in 2007 when Brian Chesky
and a friend decided to rent their apartment to guests
for a local convention. To accommodate the guests,
they used air mattresses and referred to it as the “Air
Bed & Breakfast.” It was that weekend when the
idea—and the potential viability—of a peer-to-peer
room-sharing business model was born. During its
15-year existence, Airbnb had experienced immense
growth and had successfully launched an IPO in
2020. By 2021, Airbnb had entered over 220 countries with more than 5 million locations.1 In 2022,
Airbnb seemed positioned to continue revolutionizing the hotel and tourism industry through its business model that allowed hosts to offer spare rooms or
entire homes to potential guests in a peer-reviewed
digital marketplace.
Airbnb’s business model had been successful by
leveraging what is known as the sharing economy. As
it grew, however, Airbnb’s business model was met
with resistance. City officials and owners and operators of hotels, motels, and bed and breakfasts complained that, unlike traditional brick-and-mortar
establishments that were subject to regulations and
taxation, Airbnb hosts were able to circumvent and
avoid such liabilities due to participation in Airbnb’s
digital marketplace. In other instances, Airbnb hosts
had encountered legal issues due to city and state ordinances governing hotels and apartment leases.
Then, in 2020, the spread of COVID-19 and the
global pandemic posed an existential crisis for
Airbnb and other businesses such as hotels operating
in the travel and accommodation market. Many
Airbnb hosts were using their hosting revenue to
s­ ubsidize their mortgage payments while other hosts
had purchased properties that depended solely on
the revenue driven through booked Airbnb accommodations. In the early part of the pandemic during
2020, travel restrictions and shelter-in-place orders to
mitigate the spread of COVID-19 significantly
­impacted travel.
As vaccines were distributed during 2021 and
many countries had reopened their economies, Airbnb’s
bookings and revenues grew to more than 300 million
and nearly $6 billion (see Exhibit 1). However, at the
start of 2022, the company had yet to have a profitable year, with some suggesting that the company
needed radical changes in elements of its business
model to justify its lofty stock price. The company’s
$114 billion market capitalization indicated that
­investors continued to believe in Airbnb’s potential,
but excuses for continuing losses were becoming
more difficult as the company had achieved sufficient
scale to become profitable. Exhibit 2 presents
Airbnb, Inc.’s income statements for 2019 through
2021. The company’s balance sheets for 2020 and
2021 are presented in Exhibit 3.
Overview of the Accommodation
Market
Hotels, motels, and bed and breakfasts competed
within the larger tourist accommodation market. All
businesses operating within this sector offered lodging but were differentiated by their amenities. Hotels
and motels were defined as larger facilities accommodating guests in single or multiple rooms. Motels
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EXHIBIT 1
Airbnb, Inc.’s Bookings, Gross Booking Value, and Revenues by Geographic Region,
2020–2021 (in millions, except percentages)
2020
% of Total
2021
% of Total
Nights and Experiences Booked
North America
75.5
39%
114.0
38%
EMEA
67.7
35%
118.1
39%
Latin America
22.4
12%
38.8
13%
Asia Pacific
27.6
14%
29.7
10%
Total
193.2
100%
300.6
100%
Gross Booking Value
$13,169.9
55%
$25,305.5
54%
EMEA
6,660.1
28%
14,606.9
31%
Latin America
1,700.8
??7%
3,706.0
??8%
Asia Pacific
2,366.1
10%
3,258.6
??7%
Total
$23,896.9
100%
$46,877.0
100%
North America
$ 1,772.7
53%
$ 3,201.1
54%
1,023.8
30%
1,930.8
32%
242.0
??7%
431.2
??7%
North America
Revenue
EMEA
Latin America
Asia Pacific
Total
339.7
10%
428.7
??7%
$ 3,378.2
100%
$ 5,991.8
100%
Source: Airbnb, Inc. 2021 Form 10-K.
specifically offered smaller rooms with direct parking
lot access from the unit and amenities such as laundry facilities to travelers who were using their own
transportation. Motels might also be located closer
to roadways, providing guests quicker and more convenient access to highways. It was also not uncommon for motel guests to segment a longer road trip as
they commuted to a vacation destination, thereby
potentially staying at several motels during their
travel. Hotels, however, invested heavily in additional
amenities as they competed for all segments of travelers. Amenities, including on-premise spa facilities
and fine dining, were often offered by the hotel.
­Furthermore, properties offering spectacular views,
bolstering a hotel as the vacation destination, may
contribute to significant operating costs. In total,
wages, property, and utilities, as well as purchases
such as food, accounted for 57 percent of the industry’s total costs (see Exhibit 4). The primary market
segments of hotels and motels are presented in
­Exhibit 5.
Bed and breakfasts, however, were much smaller,
as they usually were where owner-operators offered a
couple of rooms within their own home to accommodate guests. The environment of the bed and
breakfast—one of a cozy, homelike ambiance—was
what the guest desired when booking a room. Contrasted with the hotel or motel, a bed and breakfast
offered a more personalized, quieter atmosphere.
Furthermore, many bed and breakfast establishments
were in rural areas where the investment to establish
a larger hotel may have been cost-prohibitive, yet the
location itself could be an attraction to tourists. In
these areas, individuals invested in a home and property, possibly with a historical background, to offer a
bed and breakfast with great allure and ambience for
the guests’ experiences. Thus, the bed and breakfast
competed through offering an ambiance associated
Case 1 Airbnb in 2022
233
EXHIBIT 2
Airbnb, Inc.’s Income Statements, 2019–2021 (in thousands, except per share amounts)
Revenue
2021
2020
2019
$5,991,760
$ 3,378,199
$4,805,239
1,155,833
876,042
1,196,311
847,057
877,901
815,074
Costs and expenses:
Cost of revenue
Operations and support
Product development
Sales and marketing
General and administrative
1,425,048
2,752,872
976,695
1,186,332
1,175,325
1,621,519
835,324
1,134,851
697,181
Restructuring charges
112,849
151,355
0
Total costs and expenses
5,562,443
6,968,346
5,306,782
429,317
(3,590,147)
(501,543)
Income (loss) from operations
Interest income
12,734
27,117
85,902
Interest expense
(437,599)
(171,688)
(9,968)
Other income (expense), net
(304,659)
(947,220)
13,906
Loss before income taxes
(300,207)
(4,681,938)
(411,703)
51,827
(97,222)
262,636
Provision for (benefit from) income taxes
Net loss
$ (352,034)
$ (4,584,716)
$ (674,339)
Net loss per share attributable to Class A and
Class B common stockholders, basic and diluted
$(0.57)
$(16.12)
$(2.59)
Weighted-average shares used in computing net
? loss per share attributable to Class A and Class B
common stockholders, basic and diluted
615,891
284,363
260,556
Source: Airbnb, Inc. 2021 Form 10-K.
with a more rural, slower pace through which travelers connected with their hosts and the surrounding
community.
While differing in size and target consumer, all
­hotels, motels, and bed and breakfasts were subject
to city, state, and federal regulations. These regulations covered areas such as the physical property and
food safety, access for persons with disabilities, and
even alcohol distribution. Owners and operators
were subject to paying fees for different licenses to
operate. Due to operating as a business, these properties and the associated revenues were also subject to
state and federal taxation.
In addition to regulations, the need to construct
physical locations prevented hotels and motels from
expanding quickly, especially in new international
markets. Larger chains tended to expand by purchasing preexisting physical locations or through mergers
and acquisitions, such as Marriott International
Inc.’s acquisition of Starwood Hotels and Resorts
Worldwide in 2016.
A Business Model for the Sharing Economy
Startup companies have been functioning in a space
commonly referred to as the “sharing economy” for
several years. According to Chesky, the previous
model for the economy was based on ownership.2
Thus, operating a business first necessitated ownership of the assets required to do business. Any spare
capacity the business faced—either within production
or service—was a direct result of the purchase of hard
assets in the daily activity of conducting business.
Airbnb and other similar companies, however, operated through offering a technological platform,
where individuals with spare capacity could offer
their services. By leveraging the ubiquitous usage of
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EXHIBIT 3
Airbnb, Inc.’s Balance Sheets, 2020–2021 (in thousands, except par value)
As of December 31
Assets
Current Assets:
Cash and cash equivalents
Marketable securities
Restricted cash
Funds receivable and amounts held on behalf of customers
? Prepaids and other current assets (including customer receivables of $189,753 and $142,519
and allowances of $90,547 and $30,870, respectively)
?? Total current assets
Property and equipment, net
Operating lease right-of-use assets
Intangible assets, net
Goodwill
Other assets, noncurrent
Total assets
Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity
Current Liabilities:
Accounts payable
?? Operating lease liabilities, current
Accrued expenses and other current liabilities
Funds payable and amounts payable to customers
Unearned fees
?? Total current liabilities
Long-term debt, net of current portion
Operating lease liabilities, noncurrent
Other liabilities, noncurrent
Total liabilities
Commitments and contingencies
Stockholders’ equity:
Common stock, $0.0001 par value, 2,000,000 shares of Class A common stock authorized as of ­
? December 31, 2020 and 2021; 115,500 and 364,500 shares of Class A common stock issued and
outstanding as of December 31, 2020 and 2021, respectively; 710,000 shares of Class B common
stock authorized as of December 31, 2020 and 2021; 483,697 and 269,024 shares of Class B
­common stock issued and outstanding as of December 31, 2020 and 2021, respectively; 2,000,000
shares of Class C common stock authorized as of December 31, 2020 and 2021; zero shares of
Class C common stock issued and outstanding as of December 31, 2020 and 2021; 26,000 shares
of Class H common stock authorized as of December 31, 2020 and 2021; 9,200 shares issued and
zero shares of Class H common stock outstanding as of December 31, 2020 and 2021
Additional paid-in capital
Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss)
Accumulated deficit
Total stockholders’ equity
Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity
Source: Airbnb, Inc. 2021 Form 10-K.
2021
2020
$ 6,067,438 $ 5,480,557
2,255,038
910,700
14,764
33,846
3,715,471
2,181,329
333,669
309,954
12,386,380
8,916,386
156,585
270,194
272,036
384,068
52,308
75,886
652,602
655,801
188,563
189,164
$ 13,708,474 $10,491,499
$???118,361 $????79,898
63,479
56,586
1,558,243
2,414,071
3,715,471
2,181,329
903,728
407,895
6,359,282
5,139,779
1,982,537
1,815,562
372,483
430,905
218,459
203,470
8,932,761
7,589,716
63
60
11,140,284
8,904,791
(6,893)
2,639
(6,357,741)
(6,005,707)
4,775,713
2,901,783
$13,708,474 $10,491,499
Case 1 Airbnb in 2022
235
EXHIBIT 4
EXHIBIT 5
Hotel, Motel, and Bed & Breakfast
Industry Estimated Costs as
Percentage of Revenue, 2021
Major Market Segments for Hotels/
Motels in the United States, 2021
Costs
Hotels/Motels
Bed & Breakfasts
Recreation
68%
Wages
32%
30%
Business
??9%
Purchases
21%
23%
Other, including conventions
23%
Depreciation
9%
5%
Total
100%
Marketing
2%
2%
Rent and Utilities
4%
4%
Other
32%
36%
Market Segment
Hotels
Source: www.ibisworld.com.
A Change in the Consumer Experience
Source: www.ibisworld.com.
smartphones and the continual decrease in technology costs, these companies provided a platform for
individuals to instantly share a number of resources.
Thus, a homeowner with a spare room could offer it
for rent, or the car owner with spare time could offer
his or her services a couple of nights a week as a taxi
service. The individual simply signed up through the
platform and began to offer the service or resource.
The company then charged a small transaction fee as
the service between both users was facilitated.
Within its business model, Airbnb received a percentage of what the host received for the room. For
Airbnb, its revenues were decoupled from the considerable operating expenses of traditional lodging
­establishments and provided it with significantly
smaller operating costs than hotels, motels, and bed
and breakfasts. Rather than expenses related to
­owning and operating real estate properties, Airbnb’s
expenses were that of a technology company. Airbnb’s
business model, therefore, was based on the revenuecost-­margin structure of an online marketplace,
rather than a lodging establishment. For example,
Marriott International, Inc. reported over 120,000
employees in 2021,3 while Airbnb, Inc. reported under 6,000 employees.4 Yet, Airbnb’s net losses had
increased from approximately $17 million in 2018 to
more than $4.5 billion in 2020, leading to a deficit
accumulating to $6 billion.5 However, the company
had significantly reduced its net loss to $352 million
in 2021. A comparison of Airbnb’s 2020 revenue to
the world’s largest hoteliers in that same year is presented in Exhibit 6.
Airbnb, however, had not just been leveraging technology. It had also leveraged the change in how the
current consumer interacted with businesses. In conjunction with this change seemed to be how the consumer had deemphasized ownership. Instead of
focusing on ownership, consumers seemed to prefer
sharing or renting. According to Airbnb, the majority
of their guests were under 34 years of age.6 Other
startup companies had been targeting these segments
through subscription-based services and on-demand
help. From luxury watches to clothing, experiencing—
and not owning—assets seemed to be on the rise.
­Citing a more experiential-based economy, Chesky
believed Airbnb guests desired a community and a
closer relationship with the host—and there seemed
to be support for this assertion.7 A recent Goldman
Sachs study showed that, once someone used Airbnb,
their preference for a traditional accommodation was
greatly reduced.8 The appeal of the company’s value
proposition with customers had allowed it to readily
EXHIBIT 6
Annual Revenues for Airbnb, Inc.
and Leading Hotel Chains, 2020
(in billions)
Competitor
2020 Revenues
(in billions)
Marriott International, Inc.
$10.6
Hilton Worldwide Holdings
$ 4.3
Airbnb, Inc.
$ 3.4
Intercontinental Hotels Group
$ 2.4
Source: Yahoo Finance (accessed February 15, 2022).
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raise capital to support its growth. A comparison of
Airbnb’s February 2022 market capitalization to the
world’s largest hoteliers is presented in Exhibit 7.
Recognizing this shift in consumer preference,
­traditional brick-and-mortar operators responded.
Hilton was considering offering a hostel-like option
to travellers.9 Other entrepreneurs were constructing
urban properties to specifically leverage Airbnb’s
platform and offer rooms only to Airbnb users,
such as in Japan,10 where rent and hotel costs were
extremely high.
To govern the community of hosts and guests,
Airbnb instituted a rating system. Popularized by
companies such as Amazon, eBay, and Yelp, peer-topeer ratings helped police quality. Both guests and
hosts rated each other in Airbnb. This approach
­incentivized hosts to provide quality service while
­encouraging guests to leave a property as they found
it. Furthermore, the peer-to-peer rating system greatly
minimized the otherwise significant task and expense
of Airbnb employees assessing and rating each individual participant within Airbnb’s platform.
Not Playing by the Same Rules
Local and
global businesses criticized Airbnb for what they
claimed were unfair business practices and lobbied
lawmakers to force the company to comply with lodging regulations. These concerns illuminated how, due
to its business model, Airbnb and its users seemed
not to abide by these same regulations. This could
have been concerning on many levels. For the guest,
regulations exist for protection from unsafe accommodations. Fire codes and occupation limits all exist
to prevent injury and death. Laws also exist to
EXHIBIT 7
Airbnb, Inc.’s Market Capitalization
Relative to Leading Hotel Chains,
February 2022 (in billions)
Competitor
Market Capitalization
(in billions)
Airbnb, Inc.
$114
Marriott International Inc.
$ 59
Hilton Worldwide Holdings.
$ 44
Intercontinental Hotels Group
$ 13
Source: Yahoo Finance (accessed February 15, 2022).
prevent discrimination, as traditional brick-and-mortar
accommodations are barred from not providing
­lodging to guests based on race and other protected
classes, but there seemed to be evidence that Airbnb
guests had faced such discrimination from hosts.11
Hosts might also expose themselves to legal and
financial problems from accommodating guests.
There had been stories of hosts needing to evict
guests who would not leave, and, due to local ordinances, the guests were actually protected as apartment lessees. Other stories highlighted rooms and
homes being damaged by huge parties given by
Airbnb guests. Hosts might also be exposed to liability issues in the instance of an injury or even a death
of a guest.
Finally, there were accusations of businesses using
Airbnb’s marketplace to own and operate accommodations without obtaining the proper licenses. These
locations appeared to be individuals on the surface
but were actually businesses. And, because of Airbnb’s
platform, these pseudo-businesses could operate and
generate revenue without meeting regulations or
claiming revenues for taxation.
Airbnb continued to respond to some of these issues. Airbnb released a report in 2015 detailing both
discrimination on its platform and how it would be
mitigated. Airbnb also settled its lawsuit with San
Francisco in early 2017. The city was demanding
Airbnb enforce a city regulation requiring host registration or incur significant fines. As part of the settlement, Airbnb agreed to offer more information on its
hosts within the city.12 And in 2018, Airbnb began
partnering with local municipalities to help collect
taxes automatically for rentals within their jurisdictions, helping to potentially recoup millions in lost tax
revenue.13,14 In February 2022 Airbnb announced the
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with
Maui County to comply with tax regulations, stating,
“The action that we have taken demonstrates our
commitment to working hand-in-hand with the government in support of clear, fair regulations.”15
Recognizing that countries and local municipalities were responding to local business owners and
their constituents’ concerns, Chesky and Airbnb had
focused on mobilizing and advocating for consumers
and business owners who utilize the app. Airbnb’s
website provided support for guests and hosts who
wished to advocate for the site. A focal point of the
Case 1 Airbnb in 2022
advocacy emphasized how those particularly hit hard
at the height of the recession in 2009 relied on Airbnb
to establish a revenue stream and prevent the inevitable foreclosure and bankruptcy. “We wish to be regulated; this would legitimize us,” Chesky remarked to
Trevor Noah in an interview on The Daily Show.16
Airbnb as a Public Company
In 2019, Airbnb
finally announced that the long-awaited IPO would
occur during 2020. However, Airbnb dampened expectations with the announcement that it had experienced a net loss of over $300 million through
September 2019 due to increases in operating costs.17
Then, in the spring of 2020, the pandemic and efforts by the subsequent state and local governments
to stop the spread of COVID-19 presented a significant
threat to Airbnb and its business model. Instead of preparing for the IPO, Airbnb had to raise $2 billion in
private equity funding and debt to support operations during the pandemic.18,19 And in May 2020,
Airbnb announced 1,900 employees, or about onequarter of the workforce, would be let go.20
Quickly, Airbnb tried to adjust its business operations. As guests cancelled their stays with hosts,
Airbnb adjusted its cancellation policy. Normally,
hosts had discretion over how to handle cancellations. Due to travel restrictions imposed by state and
local governments, guests were forced to cancel their
stays. Yet some hosts were still charging these guests
based on their own cancellation policies. In response,
Airbnb adjusted the policy by offering refunds for
reservations made prior to March 14, 2020, through
the end of June 2020.
237
Airbnb also offered safety and cleaning guidelines
for its hosts. Given the nature of the pandemic, it had
become paramount to ensure cleanliness. A guest or
a host contracting COVID-19 due to an Airbnb stay
could most certainly make people reluctant to use
Airbnb in the future. For the hosts, however, the loss
of the revenue streams seemed to be the most immediate problem. Many hosts depended on their revenue
from rentals to afford the properties they owned,
­either as private homes or as short-term rental properties. Over the years, many hosts had built their
­f inances around the anticipated revenue from guests.
Since the pandemic began, some hosts reported they
had experienced monetary losses in the tens of thousands of dollars. To support hosts, Airbnb established a $17 million fund to help support hosts that
had acquired long-term status with Airbnb.21
To confront the challenges of the pandemic in
2020, Airbnb expanded its sharing-economy model
by entering the “Online Experiences” market. Virtual
experiences, such as cigar tastings and virtual guided
tours of cities were all being offered for patrons to
book and experience from their own home, whether
or not they were under stay-at-home orders. As hybrid and remote work become normalized due to the
pandemic in 2021, Airbnb focused its efforts on the
business travel segment.22 It was clear that in 2022,
Airbnb would be required to adjust elements of its
value proposition and profit formula to generate
profits sufficient to reward its shareholders.
Copyright © 2022 by John D. Varlaro and John E. Gamble. All rights
reserved.
ENDNOTES
1
Airbnb, Inc., “About Us—Airbnb Newsroom,” n.d., https://news.airbnb.com/
about-us/ (accessed February 15, 2022).
2
Brian Chesky, interview by Trevor Noah, The Daily Show with Trevor Noah,
Comedy Central, February 24, 2016. https://www.cc.com/video/w6eoao/thedaily-show-with-trevor-noah-brian-chesky-changing-travel-with-airbnb
(accessed August 31, 2022).
3
Marriott International, Inc. Form 10-K 2021. https://marriott.gcs-web.com/
static-files/0ca47c6d-46df-486c-b6c2-0a84ff19c927 (accessed August 31,
2022). p. 9
4
Airbnb, Inc. Form 10-K 2021. https://s26.q4cdn.com/656283129/files/
doc_financials/2020/q4/84dcc076-235d-4520-805c-0e64b6fe8c40.pdf
(accessed August 31, 2022). p. 7.
5
Ibid. p. 3
6
Ibid. p. 4
7
Brian Chesky, interview by Trevor Noah, The Daily Show with Trevor Noah,
Comedy Central, February 24, 2016. https://www.cc.com/video/w6eoao/
the-daily-show-with-trevor-noah-brian-chesky-changing-travel-with-airbnb
(accessed August 31, 2022).
8
J. Verhage, “Goldman Sachs: More and More People Who Use Airbnb Don’t
Want to Go Back to Hotels,” Bloomberg, February 26, 2016, www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2016-02-16/goldman-sachs-more-and-more-people-whouse-airbnb-don-t-want-to-go-back-to-hotels (accessed ­August 31, 2022).
9
D. Fahmy, “Millennials Spending Power Has Hilton Weighing a ‘Hostel-Like’
Brand,” Bloomberg Businessweek, March 8, 2016, www.bloomberg.com/
businessweek (accessed August 31, 2022).
10
Y. Nakamura and M. Takahashi, “Airbnb Faces Major Threat in Japan, Its
Fastest-Growing Market,” Bloomberg, February 18, 2016, www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2016-02-18/fastest-growing-airbnb-market-under-threat-asjapan-cracks-down (accessed August 31, 2022).
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R. Greenfield, “Study Finds Racial Discrimination by Airbnb Hosts,”
Bloomberg, December 10, 2015, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-12-10/study-finds-racial-discrimination-by-airbnb-hosts
(accessed August 31, 2022).
12
K. Benner, “Airbnb Adopts Rules to Fight Discrimination by Its Hosts,” New
York Times, September 8, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/
technology/airbnb-anti-discrimination-rules.html (accessed June 20, 2017).
13
S. Cameron, “New TN Agreement Ensures $13M in Airbnb Rental Taxes
­Collected,” wjhl.com, April 20, 2018, http://www.wjhl.com/local/new-tnagreement-ensures-13m-in-airbnb-rental-taxes-collected/1131192392
(accessed April 20, 2018).
14
“Duluth, Airbnb Make Deal on Lodging Tax Collection,” Twin Cities Pioneer
Press, April 19, 2018, https://www.twincities.com/2018/04/19/duluthairbnb-make-deal-on-lodging-tax-collection/ (accessed April 20, 2018).
15
“An Update on Our Work to Support Responsible Hosting in Maui,” Airbnb
.com, February 3, 2022, https://news.airbnb.com/an-update-on-our-work-tosupport-responsible-hosting-in-maui/ (accessed February 4, 2022).
16
Brian Chesky, interview by Trevor Noah, The Daily Show with Trevor Noah,
Comedy Central, February 24, 2016. https://www.cc.com/video/w6eoao/
the-daily-show-with-trevor-noah-brian-chesky-changing-travel-with-airbnb
(accessed August 31, 2022).
17
J. Eaglesham, M. Farrell, and K. Grind, “Airbnb Swings to a Loss as Costs Climb
Ahead of IPO,” Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2020 https://www.wsj.com/
articles/airbnb-swings-to-a-loss-as-costs-climb-ahead-of-ipo-11581443123
(accessed May 21, 2020).
18
E. Griffith, “Airbnb Raises $1 Billion to Stockpile Cash in Pandemic,” New
York Times, April 6, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/technology/
airbnb-coronavirus-valuation.html (accessed May 21, 2020).
19
E. Wollman, “Airbnb Gets $1 Billion Loan, Bringing Coronavirus Funding to
$2 Billion,” Wall Street Journal, April 15, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/
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